Contending directions. Gender studies in the entrepreneurial university

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S Y N O P S I S
This article explores the ambivalences and aporias that arouse from the institutionalization of degree-granting programs of Gender Studies in German-speaking countries at a time in which universities are being transformed into entrepreneurial managerially governed organizations. It asks if Gender Studies is a proactive element of those transformation processes or has, as a kind of premium segment of the academic market, even profited from them. It asks if Gender Studies has amassed sufficient academic capital to determine the rules of the academic "game" in Bourdieu's sense or if it is falling victim to global processes of academic accumulation and segmentation. The paper's main argument will be that if the paradoxical precondition for dissent is participation, and if critique and regulation are tied up in a fraught but intimate connection, then the point will be to reflect critically upon those circumstances and conditions under which we produce, distribute and consume knowledge.

In but not of the academy

In her 2009 paper on "clever women" in the university, the Viennese scholar of Romance languages and literatures Friederike Hassauer poses the punning question of how far academia is geschlechtsreif—sexually mature, or ready to be gendered. Hassauer's conclusion is mixed. She names several incontrovertible successes. Among these are the establishment of the category "gender" as a cross-cutting interdisciplinary issue and of gender impact assessments in the socio-political process, the opening up of new spaces of opportunity for women's and gender studies, a new symbolic politics, new levels of discourse and new sets of academic "table manners", along with different definitions of what counts as a faux pas in the "monastic and homosocial cathedral of academia" (Hassauer, 2009, 14). On the other hand, Hassauer states, women remain rarities in the academic community, which is still ruled by the notorious glass ceiling.

Hassauer's comments on academia in German-speaking countries addressed primarily the paradoxical situation of intellectual women and the restrictions that limited civil rights within the civitas academia impose on their scope for action. However, her points are also relevant to the potentials and perspectives of Gender Studies at a time when universities turn into entrepreneurial and/or managerial organizations structured by what, among others, Strathern (2000) has called "audit culture". Thus, maybe perhaps more urgently than ever before, in a situation in which Gender Studies became at least to some degree part of the academic system we must ask whether it is merely caught up in this reconstruction process or is at the very heart of it. Most importantly, however, Gender Studies scholars must analyse the nature of the processes in which it is a peripheral or crucial participant. This question requires us to consider how much room for manoeuvre Gender Studies currently has. That is, who is transforming whom or what, and how? Is Gender Studies a proactive component of the processes of the "professional turn" (Martin, 2011) in higher education; is it even a driving force of managerial reforms, profiting from those processes as a kind of premium segment of the academic market as some argue? But has Gender Studies indeed amassed sufficient academic capital—dedicated associations, degree courses, specialized journals, famous....

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names—for it to be in a position “to define not only the rules of the game, but also the regularities of the game, the laws governing whether, for example, … it is important or not to write about a certain subject, whether something is brilliant or outmoded” (Bourdieu, 1997, 20)? Or, quite contrary, is it falling victim to those global academic processes of accumulation and segmentation that the Bamberg sociologist Richard Münch has described as “academic cannibalism” (Münch, 2012)? There are, indeed, indicators for both scenarios: In many ways Gender Studies in the German-speaking countries (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) did become a subject like any other—skills-oriented, professionally advantageous, and its graduates welcomed to careers advice sessions at the Federal Employment Agency. Gender Studies programs, however, also still run the risk to disappear from the universities sooner rather than later, along with the rest of the humanities and social sciences, having failed to yield the expected returns. The story of Gender Studies, thus, could be told both as a success story and as a story of decline that is as the story of a project that already had its history.

In light of this preliminary sketch of the position of Gender Studies in the academic systems of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, I want to come back to Hassauer’s deliberations. If she described the university as a “monastic and homosocial” institution, we need to ask what precisely does that imply for feminist gender scholars’ chances of making a transformative difference. After all, we are speaking of an institution in which, around a hundred years after women first stepped onto the academic stage as subjects of knowledge, they are no longer simply “alien elements”. Although, however, academy granted Gender Studies a denizen status and many of us hold positions in the male-dominated academic field we can still describe the position of Gender Studies as “in but not of the academy”, as Sue Wise (1997) put it more than 15 years ago. We thus need to examine the ambivalences, aporias and paradoxes that result from this complex and contradictory location of being in but not of the academy.

Yet, does Wise’s phrase still accurately describe the situation of women academics and of Gender Studies? It is 20 years since Diane Elam und Robyn Wiegman asked with subtle irony whether feminism could really continue to position itself as a “heroic interloper into the institution’s patriarchal business as usual” (1995, 4). After all, feminism, as an “intellectual commodity”, was already demanding its “institutional wage”:

She—this is feminism now—claims a reproductive legitimacy, engaging in the practices of institutional generation, begetting scholars, journals, book series, new curricula, jobs, even job seekers. She takes her seat at the table. In private, she worries over the ultimate price of this meal. She is, let’s say it, beside herself, the watcher and the watched. She’s suspicious about her own institutional manners, her increasingly fine cut cultivations. She fears that her political identity might be at stake. (Ibid.)

So how does the game of academia work today; what are its rules? Can Gender Studies scholars expect a level playing field? Are feminist scholars playing in the Premier League? On what conditions? At what price? Moreover, what would academic women’s relationship with the field of knowledge have to be for them not merely to hold their own but also to be capable of critical interventions? Come to that, and following Judith Butler (2009), we need to ask what does critique or even dissent (whether scholarly, political, or both) actually mean within an institution where “academic freedom” is politically legitimated and, at least for the time being, underwritten by the state? Does the description of academia as a “monastic and homosocial cathedral” still apply? What are the table manners that academics must now master? What are the social situations in which the fine points of the new academic etiquette have to be applied—and who defines them?

Now I do not claim that any of these questions is novel. However, I believe that we need to pose them afresh, given that academic feminism can, or must, act within social, political, scientific and research-policy configurations and power relationships which may be more contradictorily imbricated today than ever before in academic feminism’s history. Many aspects converge here. Let me enumerate just some of the dynamics that are affecting Gender Studies at least in the German-speaking contexts directly; I will return later to what I call in reference to Carl Polanyi’s work (Polanyi, 1957 [1944]) the broader “great transformation” being experienced by scholarship and the university as part of the global neoliberal reorganization of society.

1. Although to some extent we currently witness a resurgence of feminism, it is historically still on the wane, and its history continuous to be rewritten with more or less sophistication. In the German context this can be seen in endeavours on the one hand to caricature feminism, on the other to rearticulate it in the terms of the free market, as the neo-bourgeois elitist project of a self-appointed F-Klasse (“F” for “woman”, “class” in reference to the top-of-the-range Mercedes “S-class”). To reinvent feminism, as sociologist Sylvia Walby (2005) argues, as a kind of brand. To this end, it seems necessary to envision radical feminist interventions in, and critique of, a heteronormative and hierarchical sexual contract as part of a history that we should now leave behind, if it is not altogether told as a discredited and even risible episode. Feminism today can thus be seen both as part of the dispositif whose objective is a new, post-welfarist social contract including modernized gender relations, and as part of the forces that critique that very social contract.6

2. Closely connected to this is the absorption of many of the visions and goals of the new women’s movement into neoliberal models of society. As Nancy Fraser argues, second-wave feminism’s “hopes were conscripted in the service of a project that was deeply at odds with the larger [and older, S.H.]; holistic feminist vision of a just society”: “utopian desires found a second life as currents that legitimated the transition to a new form of capitalism” (Fraser, 2009, 99; see also McRobbie, 2008), rearticulating feminism as a component of the way we are ruled, including by gender. At present—and probably for the first time in history—feminism thus appears not exclusively as a force that is borne by a social movement or is itself a social movement, as a force that acts “from below”, but also as a movement “from above”. This becomes clear not least in the way that the democratic governments alongside supranational organizations such as the European Commission are, to an extent, stepping into the place of feminists and feminist movements (see Crompton, 2002; McRobbie,
3. Finally, the field of Gender Studies is under pressure from what one might, with Rosa Luxemburg, call “land grabbing”. There are attempts to reformulate Gender Studies (in line with current definitions of gender) as a key competence, to reformulate management diversity policies, advanced across the European Union, as part of a new governmental managerial rationality. This is a rationality in which, as the Austrian political scientists Birgit Sauer and Stefanie Wöhl put it, “the government of changing social, ethnic and gender distinctions becomes a neoliberalized modernized form of governmental and social control on a ‘new’ level” (Sauer & Wöhl, 2008, 250–1). The objectives of these new ways of governing human beings, they write, are a remodelled subject, reimagined social and political institutions, and the management of inequality within fragmented social and economic relations. As a result, the antidiscrimination and diversity policies that were once strategies of the women’s movement and other social movements now risk losing their critical potential to achieve social change. Diversity policies, Sauer and Wöhl argue, are becoming instruments that not only steer inequality but also produce it.

In view of such dynamics, sketched only briefly here, today’s societal configuration is one in which, firstly, feminism has become part of the everyday scheme of things yet is simultaneously reviled. Secondly, neoliberal post–second-wave and antifeminist forces are working on the reformulation of feminism as a fundamentally heteronormative, solipsistic and elitist project “from above”. Yet, simultaneously they endeavour to establish a caricature of feminism as puritanical, lesbian, man-hating, sclerotic and inveterately censorial, along with its “disarticulation” (in McRobbie’s phrase, 2008) as a multidimensional, glocal, polyphonous and often contradictory political praxis “from below” (see also Hark, 2014). Feminism is thus not only historically disparaged, but transferred into a different scheme of intelligibility, enhancing its potential compatibility with a new set of social forces. Thirdly, feminism is delegitimized as a practice of critical thinking that intervenes in hegemonic realities, that regards knowledge and theory as an element of emancipatory social change with the aim of enabling different ways of being in the world. Fourthly, Women’s or Gender Studies is being used as a token of academic excellence and yet is often and as many interview partners in our case studies on Gender Studies in Austria, Germany and Switzerland conferred simultaneously denigrated as being overly politicized and therefore unscientific. Fifthly, as Clare Hemmings (2011) has recently shown for the UK, both feminism’s alleged failure and its success are ascribed as reasons to close down women’s studies departments. In this situation, it becomes an urgent task to ask what function Gender Studies should fulfill within a radically altered university, and into which discursive, scholarly and political alliances it should enter or be integrated.

However, the questions associated with this have hitherto attracted little attention. How feminist knowledge is permeated by academic structures and conventions, higher education policy or research promotion policies, for example, has barely been addressed. Yet we urgently need to ask what kind of gender research will survive the transformation of universities into entrepreneurial entities. We need to analyse how the universities’ “asymmetrical gender culture”, as Bielefeld sociologist Ursula Müller (1999) has called it, configures not only individual women’s academic career opportunities but also the degree of “refraction” (Bourdieu, 1997, 15) that Women’s and Gender Studies can apply, and thus define its chances of success. Moreover, although it seems obvious that feminist knowledge and its forms of academic organization are in many ways affected by new kinds of university governance, the universities’ transformation into entrepreneurial institutions, the European-wide process of higher education reform, increased demand for a gender knowledge tailored to administrative deployment, or the rhetorical upgrading of Gender Studies in the context of competitive European excellence initiatives, there is a lack of substantial research on these dynamics. Are, for example, projects that carry the Gender Studies label taking part, and if so to what extent, in the implementation of what Jena sociologists Claus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa call the qualification of people for “marketability”—something that is regarded with increasing self-evidence and conviction as the “badge of modernity” and has achieved dominance in “practically all spheres of life”, including the university (Dörre, Lessenich & Rosa, 2009, 10–11)?

Clearly, a full discussion of such questions would go far beyond the constraints of this article. In the following, therefore, I would like to concentrate on the issue of what constitutes the “great transformation” that higher education and scholarship are currently undergoing. For any critical attempt to locate Gender Studies’ place in the academy will have to take into account the rapidly changing institutions of scholarship and higher education. In other words, we need to know what is happening in the university because its transformation also defines the perimeters of possibilities for gender research. However, it also has to take into account the fact that we ourselves participate actively in shaping this transformation process, the radical reconstruction of higher education and science—even if not “under circumstances chosen by [ourselves], but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1968 [1852], 97).

The “great transformation”

Karl Polanyi (1957 [1944]) famously described the rise of modern market societies as the “great transformation”. The key feature of that transformation was the parallel emergence of market economies and nation states and, especially, a growing orientation on markets along with the economy’s increasing independence from society. The modern research university that arose in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century must be seen in the same context.9 The modern university was made possible by the great transformation and at the same time participated substantially in its progress, specifically through functions related to the formation of the nation state and national cultures. The university as we now still know it was, consequently, a national undertaking, both enabled and constrained by a particular pact between state and university whereby the university contributed to the construction of national identity and, in return, scholars were guaranteed academic freedom.10 Today we are facing what can justifiably be described as an equally great transformation:
the global reinvention of the university as an entrepreneurial, managerially governed entity whose prime task is no longer to produce cognition and good citizens, but applicable knowledge to secure global competitiveness.

The triangle of state, market and university has thus been subjected to a complete overhaul by neoliberalism, with the university drawn towards the market without being released from supervision by the state. According to Simons and Masschelein (2009), the university is changing from an institution, the raison d’être of which is education through research and which can be judged in terms of its fulfilment of that raison d’être, to an output-oriented organization that approaches everything and everyone as a resource, regarding itself as “part of a competitive space and focusing on entrepreneurial opportunities”, making productive use of its resources to meet new needs. As a result, the university—and all its members, including us— is “required to position itself spatially within an environment that is permanently facing needs and confronting limited resources. And it is in view of these needs and resources that entrepreneurship is experienced as an essential quality” (ibid., 209).

The wider goal of the new university is, then, spatial orientation; it must organize itself along the lines of “global positioning systems”, argue Simons and Masschelein (ibid.). We are all familiar with numerous examples: the constant demands on every member of the organization to improve his or her performance, the situation of students who are expected to keep investing in their human capital, the incessant need to innovate and confronting limited resources. And it is in view of these needs and resources that entrepreneurship is experienced as an essential quality” (ibid., 209).

What all academics and students in higher education have to understand, in other words, is how to conceive of their life as a production process that they can and must manage in pursuit of the greatest possible innovation and performance. For accompanying the “entrepreneurial university” and its teachers and students is “the managerial maxim ‘innovate’—innovation and finding ‘innovation gaps’ thus being perceived as goals in themselves” (Simons & Masschelein, 2009, 209). “The message to the academic world is clear: compare yourself, be better than the others, increase the output through more efficient use of the means, or optimize the input–output ratio” (Masschelein & Simons, 2009, 86). The entrepreneurial university, in short, is the machinery that creatively transforms human and other resources into products (technology, skills) and submits society to permanent innovation.14

As a global political programme, we find this new set of expectations of the university described in EU pronouncements, particularly in the context of first the Lisbon Strategy (2000–2010), then Europe 2020 (2010–2020)12. Under the heading “What's the problem with Europe’s universities?” the EU’s FAQ page explains, for example: “The performance of developed economies is closely related to their ability to create, disseminate and apply knowledge. These three poles—education, research, innovation—are known as the ‘knowledge triangle’. Unfortunately, Europe has fallen behind in all three parts of the knowledge triangle, and needs to improve its performance in each of them” (European Union, 2006). European universities therefore require a modernizing agenda that concentrates on their attractiveness and excellence (differentiating between institutions on the basis of specific strengths); new forms of self-regulation (through the ability to set strategic goals and adopt professional personnel management systems); increased attraction of donations (by diversifying sources and concentrating less on input, more on correct output in the shape of students or research).

The ultimate goal of both the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 is to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”.13 It should be at least briefly mentioned here that the Bologna reforms are integral to these policies, which aim not only to create a unified European university space but also, and especially, to improve the international competitiveness of the European higher education system.

The new economic and managerial order of rationality14

Following Richard Sennett (1998), we may also describe these transformations in higher education as a reorientation towards a “regime of flexibility”. Primarily three processes characterize this regime:

1. The discontinuous reinvention of institutions: for the present purposes, this concerns the reformulation of the relationship between state and university. The state and supranational actors demand of universities and research institutions that they deploy their public funding within a given order of rationality—namely, within parameters informed by business methods. The political sphere reserves the right to set global qualitative and quantitative targets with respect to the research and teaching offered, capacities, and budgets. In return, it assures the necessary general legislative and (within limits) financial conditions, with the universities largely retaining autonomy in operational matters. Secondly, the principles of economization and rationalization impose a “discontinuous reinvention” of processes of research and knowledge transmission. Key points here are the separation of administrative, management and research tasks; the development of a university profile; constant evaluations and controlling processes with the introduction of numeric indicators to measure academic output in research and teaching—the principle of “ruling by numbers”. Further indicators are the recasting of substantive distinctions as hierarchical orders, rankings that signal the paradigm change towards societies of greater inequality and the transformation of education into an economically relevant positional good; or excellence initiatives that favour the gentrification and hierarchical segmentation of academia—the emergence of premium segments and banlieues.

2. The flexible specialization of production: that is, an extreme pressure to rationalize and the burgeoning presence of the market as a structuring principle in intra-academic processes. Indications of this are the reorientation of research and teaching towards the requirements of the market (especially the labour market) and marketability; the new role of students as customers of the university and consumers of the commodity knowledge and training, and the proliferation of increasingly compartmentalized, supposedly highly tailored degree courses. Cooperation between industry and higher education to establish new institutes and courses
developed expressly to fulfill, for example, a particular company’s requirements, and the role of universities as venture capitalists that sell their research directly to industry also point in this direction.

3. The concentration of power without centralization of power: above all, this means the further erosion of the democratic structures and legitimacy of academic self-administration through the introduction of new, hierarchical management and auditing mechanisms that are set to change the structures of decision-making and power within universities.

All these processes are unfolding in a context of ever scarcer funding and the targeted redistribution of resources both between the various universities and research institutions and, within the universities, between subjects and faculties—“academic cannibalism” (Münch, 2012). Given that the number of graduates is supposed to be significantly boosted while basic funding is melting away, this situation faces universities with a sharply exacerbated distributional conflict over financial resources and “human capital”, the competition for the “best minds”. Such rivalries arise between individual universities; between different types of institution (traditional universities, universities of applied sciences, and non-university research facilities); between subjects; and between the sexes or “home” and “international” academics. They also involve intense competition for research objects and legitimate theoretical approaches and methods, for degree course profiles and contents.

Gender studies in times of university transformation

I hope it has become somewhat clearer what exactly Gender Studies is caught up in or perhaps is itself helping to advance, even if we cannot fully assess the reach of the transformations we are experiencing at present and do not ask ourselves often enough whether we want to be a part of them. But what are the implications of this admittedly sketchy diagnosis? What room for manoeuvre do we have in a globalized knowledge economy? If Gender Studies, as an academically young subject, is a heteronomous field in Bourdieu’s sense, with little power of “refraction”—in other words if we are a discipline (are we even a discipline?) with wholly insufficient capacities to fight off external demands or reframe them into our own criteria—does that mean we are particularly vulnerable to these transformations? After all, the feminist political project of refuting mastery cannot be translated one-to-one into a project of critical scholarship; nor does the intellectual project of a critical theory necessarily imply an institutional practice free of marginalization and segregation, normalization and discipline. On the contrary, a position on the borders, in the margins, may actually affirm hegemonic orders of centre and periphery or install new ones instead of subverting them effectively. In addition, any degree of integration, however modest, into sedimented hegemonic structures may exhaust critical potential and absorb countercultural energies. It could culminate, for example, in the new knowledge assuming gatekeeping functions vis-à-vis other intellectual innovations and critical claims as had happened, in the German context, in regard to Queer Studies. Moreover, it were, after all, feminists in the institutions who were among the first to develop performance-based incentive systems (in equal opportunities policy, for example) and thus tie resource allocation to a success or failure measured in numerical terms. Do we thus really believe that the illusio appertaining to academic feminism—the belief that we are “in but not of” the academy—protects us from having to observe the new table manners? Do we have alternative etiquettes to hand?

To this extent, the substantive aspiration to reject mastery is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the transformation of a field, quite apart from the question of what might be reliable criteria to judge the transformation of intellectual fields. Changing a field means, above all, changing the rules of its game. Yet changing the rules requires not only a certain virtuosity in applying those rules, but also—and this is exactly the thorny test for a feminist knowledge project that regards itself as critical of hegemony—the initial acceptance of the rules and the stakes, if only for pragmatic reasons. This means that the success or failure of a project is decided not, or not solely, by one’s own motives and intentions, but by one’s virtuosity in handling the existing structures and action schemata. “The good player,” comments Bourdieu, “who is so to speak the game incarnate, does at every moment what the game requires. That presupposes a permanent capacity for invention, indispensable if one is to be able to adapt to indefinitely varied and never completely identical situations” (1990, 63). Only if you know the rules, therefore, or rather if you are given the opportunity to learn the game in detail, only if you master the game, if you can anticipate where the ball will hit the ground, but also—perhaps the most important point—only if you can take up a critical stance on the game and its rules and query their rationality, as opposed to simply obeying them, will you ultimately survive in the field and be able to change it successfully. Dissent and participation, in other words, are inextricable. Taking part in the dominant rules of the game, accepting them, is the precarious precondition for change.

Returning to Marx’s famous words from The Eighteenth Brumaire, this paradox might be reformulated for the conditions of possibility of Gender Studies as a field of critical thinking: even if we make our knowledge not under circumstances we have chosen ourselves “but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1968 [1852], 97), we do make that knowledge. As Marx and Engels observe in The German Ideology, human beings make circumstances just as much as circumstances make human beings (Marx & Engels, 1947 [1845–46], 29). This is where the opportunities lie for recalcitrant knowledge cultures. For it is through the creative process of contesting dominant representations and sedimented, hegemonic social practices in the organizations of academia, and through producing our own knowledge and representations, that institutionally entrenched contradictions and intellectual limitations begin to dissolve and hegemonic knowledge is threatened with the loss of its existing form and direction.

However, a particular challenge arises from the dialectical statement that we make our own history and our knowledge, yet not under conditions chosen ourselves but ones already given. That challenge requires constantly new responses. Although we make academic facts—as regards both content and organizational form—ourselves and are responsible for the shape of the field, we make those facts, precisely, “under circumstances directly encountered ... from the past”. That is, we make them from a starting point in the field that we did not create ourselves and that configures and delimits
our options from the outset. As sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann observed, "institutions ..., by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct". They set up "prefixed patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would theoretically be possible. ... This controlling character is inherent in institutionalization as such" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, 55). Organizational psychologist Oswald Neuberger goes further, describing organizations as "hegemonic entities which interlock individuals’ action lastingly and so closely that, as they pursue their own models and interests, they cannot help but also fulfill the purposes of others" (Neuberger, 1995, 33). In this sense, historically given institutional conditions may not absolutely determine critical knowledge projects and critical practices, but they do configure and constrain them—since, as Sigmund Freud pointed out in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1922), the institution robs the individuals of their capacity for reflection in order to secure its own survival. Critical projects, too, are constantly exposed to the danger of fulfilling extrinsic objectives and thus taking on a different form and direction from the ones they had intended or imagined. "Emancipatory practice", argues the sociologist Edit Kirsch-Auwärter (1996, 28), may therefore "unwittingly become affirmative", and even resistant representations may still be "exclusionary, hegemonic instruments". As Rachel Lee (2002) notes, we can never make critical knowledge projects completely and solely critical and interrogatory ones—they will always also have a regulating aspect.

Yet if it is true that the paradoxical precondition for dissent is participation, if power is the raw material of all action (Friedberg, 1997), and if critique and regulation are tied up in a fraught but intimate connection, then the point will be to reflect critically upon those circumstances and conditions that we did not create ourselves but under which we act—in this case, under which we produce, distribute and consume knowledge. That means constantly re-interrogating the "hegemonically conditioned limits of our own thinking and acting" (Kirsch-Auwärter, 1996, 44), of our speaking and writing, teaching and publishing, institutional action and reaction. For the endeavour to "speak out exactly who and what kind of activity is enabled and who or what is constrained" (Wagner, 1994, 16), under what exact circumstances, is a vital precondition for the question if Gender Studies serves as a proactive component of managerial reform or continues to be a site of the critical interrogation of these transformations.

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Endnotes

1 For example, the Potsdam-based group studying “small subjects” in German universities, "Kleine Fächer" (http://www.kleinefacher.de). This group categorizes the “small subjects” according to trends derived from developments in the number of professorships. The group sees an expansion in gender studies, based on an 81 per cent increase in professorships since 1997. However, it takes no account of the pre-Bologna situation—for example, the facts that gender studies is a “young” subject, the first full chair in Germany was established only in 1987, and the majority of the professorships counted by the Potsdam group are only partially denominated as “gender studies”. See the final report, Kleine Fächer (2012). Gabriele Griffin, too, regards the development of gender studies as a success story, basing her assessment on the level of institutionalization. Gender studies, she argues, exists in several European countries as “a discipline in its own right with degree-awarding powers” (Griffin, 2010, 244), a strong research infrastructure has been successfully built, and attention to gender issues promises career advancement—remarkable achievements for such a young discipline (ibid., 248). Griffin also notes the excellent opportunities for graduate careers outside academia. See also Griffin (2002).

2 In Germany, the "Fachgesellschaft Geschlechterstudien/Gender Studies Association" (Gender e.V.) was founded in Berlin in January 2010 (see www.fg-
degree.de).


4 In our research project on the history of the institutionalization of Gender Studies programs in the German-speaking countries we found evidence for both the continual success of Gender Studies as well as for its precarious condition. For further information on the project see www.genderchange-academia.eu. See also Claire Hemmings Why Stories Matter. The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory (2011).

5 I have previously addressed these issues in detail in Dissidente Partizipation. Eine Diskursgeschichte des Feminismus (Hark, 2006). See also Hark (2007).

6 Most prominently, it is Angela McRobbie who argued this. See her The Aftermath of Feminism. Gender, Culture and Social Change (2009).

7 In the research project ‘Nach Bologna: Gender Studies in the univereinigten Hochschule we investigate the processes of the institutionalization of Gender Studies degree programs in the context of the so-called Bologna reform and the entrepreneurial transformation of the academic system. The empirical study is a collaboration between Prof Angelika Wetterer (chair in the sociology of gender relations at the University of Graz) and myself (Zentrum für Interdisziplinaire Frauen-und Geschlechterforschung, TU Berlin). It forms part of the German, Austrian and Swiss programme “Entrepreneurial Universities and GenderChange: Arbeit – Organisation – Wissen”, which is jointly funded by the German Research Foundation DFG, the Austrian Science Fund FWF, and the Swiss National Science Foundation SNSF (http://genderchange-academia.eu).

8 In the UK, Hemmings writes, Gender Studies is “most likely to be institutionally supported where it is harnessed to globalization and seen as producing future gender mainstreaming or gender and development experts. … The institutional validation of the [LSE] Institute relies on our capacity to highlight the degrees’ global value within this discursive ordering. … In this respect, gender studies is understood to be relevant in a U.K. context primarily where its institutional formation reinforces the split between times and places where gender equality is understood to have been, or not been, achieved” (Hemmings, 2011, 10–11).

9 On the emergence of the modern research university see among others Reinhard Brandt’s insightful essay Wozu noch Universitäten? (2011).

10 On this issue, see among others Readings (1996), Sinons and Masschelein (2009), Masschelein and Simons (2010), and Brandt (2011).

11 Volker Schmidt (2012) presents figures that clarify this point. At the turn of the twentieth century—a time when “Germany was widely considered to be the world’s leading scientific power”—the academic personnel employed at German universities comprised 2,667 persons. At the end of 2011, according to the Federal Statistical Office, the number was 334,000. In absolute terms, that is an expansion by a factor of 125”. According to UNESCO, in 2006 there were around 7.2 million academics in the worldwide university sector alone, 2 million more than in 1997. Researchers working in industry are not included in that figure. Schmidt was writing on the German Sociological Association (DGS) blog (Schmidt, 2012).


13 Commission of the European Communities (2003, 2). The focal points of the Europe 2020 strategy are research and development, university education, and lifelong learning, with the aims of increasing economic growth, improving social cohesion and promoting environmentally friendly technologies.

14 The literature on this topic is extensive. As well as the studies already cited, see especially Clark (1998); Knobloch (2010); Münch (2007, 2009); Slaughter and Rhoades (2004).

References


